1: POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS
(I) INTRODUCTION
Lazarus: the right to security |
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Summary: Lazarus argument cautions against viewing the right to security as a meta-right (ie. A right which is seen as a pre-condition to the enjoyment of all other rights); if we are to recognize a right to security, it needs to be meaningful on its own terms and distinctive and specifically articulated in terms of the clear and meaningful obligations and duties it creates, designed to protect essential interests which cannot be protected through already existing rights; if we privilege the right to security, this may detract or distract from other rights; our focus should be on protecting these other rights in their first instance; any right to security needs to be narrow in order to risk it being used to legitimate the coercive overreach of the state using the politics and rhetoric of security; if we don’t resist the tendency to use the right to security as a means through which all other human interests are protected, we risk colluding in a subtle reordering of the hierarchy of rights, with rights to liberty, life and dignity being submerged under the apex of the right to security |
Competing conceptions of security:
The right to security
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